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Optimal Decisions in a Time Priority QueueI
Ryan Donnellya, Luhui Ganb
aDepartment of Applied Mathematics, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA
bCubist Systematic Strategies, Singapore
Abstract
We show how the position of a limit order in the queue influences the decision of whether to cancel
the order or let it rest. Using ultra high-frequency data from the Nasdaq exchange, we perform
empirical analysis on various limit order book events and propose novel ways for modelling some of
these events, including cancellation of limit orders in various positions and size of market orders.
Based on our empirical findings, we develop a queuing model that captures stylized facts on the
data. This model includes a distinct feature which allows for a potentially random effect due
to the agent’s impulse control. We apply the queuing model in an algorithmic trading setting by
considering an agent maximizing her expected utility through placing and cancelling of limit orders.
The agent’s optimal strategy is presented after calibrating the model to real data. A simulation
study shows that for the same level of standard deviation of terminal wealth, the optimal strategy
has a 2.5% higher mean compared to a strategy which ignores the effect of position; or a 8.8%
lower standard deviation for the same level of mean. This extra gain stems from posting a limit
order during adverse conditions and obtaining a good queue position before conditions become
favourable.
Keywords: algorithmic trading, high frequency trading, limit order book, queuing model, order
flow, impulse control, adverse selection
1. Introduction
Most major modern stock exchanges have switched to electronic limit order books (LOBs) as the
primary matching mechanism of trades. Along with this evolution comes a surge in computerized
trading algorithms. These algorithms are developed to perform a variety of tasks (for example,
IThe authors would like to thank Sebastian Jaimungal (University of Toronto) and Yaroslav Melnyk (EPFL)
for their comments and suggestions, as well as participants at the Research in Options 2016 conference and the
Conference on Mathematical Modelling in Finance 2017.
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executing a large order or providing liquidity to the market) by quickly digesting information from
the market and sending orders to the exchange. The success of a trading algorithm relies on two
fundamental questions: what type of orders should be sent and what is the optimal time to do so?
Many LOBs adopt a price-time priority rule, that is, the priorities of limit orders (LOs) facing exe-
cution by a market order (MO) are based first on their price, and then on their time of submission.
Within a queue at a fixed price, the first LO which is matched to an incoming MO is the one which
was placed at the earliest time. When an LO is placed, it resides at the back of the queue and only
moves forward if other LOs in front of it are cancelled or if an incoming MO lifts other orders from
the queue.
If an agent has an LO active in the LOB at the best price, there are a number of factors to consider
when trying to determine the best course of action with respect to cancelling the order or letting it
rest. One factor is the probability that an incoming MO would transact with the agent’s LO. This
will depend on the position of the LO in the queue, since if it is farther from the front then it will
have a smaller chance of being filled by a MO. Another factor is the likelihood that the agent may
want to place the order back in the queue a short time after cancelling it. This will be affected
by both the position of the LO as well as the total queue length. If the queue is very long and
the agent’s LO is near the front, then it will take a long time for a new order to reach the current
position should it be cancelled and replaced later.
In this paper, we show how to form the optimal decisions to place and cancel LOs in a single
queue based on the queue length and position of the LO. To achieve this goal, our first step is to
perform an empirical study on LOB dynamics. Using Nasdaq data, we study various LOB features
including the rate of addition and cancellation of LOs, rate of MO arrival, distribution of MO size,
and distribution of replenished queue length. In particular, we wish to investigate how these events
depend on the length of the best price queue. We also attempt to gauge the profitability of an
LO execution based on an observable trade indicator. We propose a statistical model to describe
the dynamics of these features. To the best of our knowledge, some of these empirical findings
are novel, in particular the dependence of these events on the length of the queue. For example,
we find that the intensity of cancellation of a limit order at a particular position in the queue has
significant dependence on the position of the order, but little dependence on the total length of
the queue. We also find that though market orders seldom go beyond the best price level, a large
proportion of them deplete the entire queue at the best price level; the size of market orders is well
described as a random variable right-censored by the volume at the best price level.
Based on our empirical study, we construct a queuing model for a single price level on one side
of the LOB. In our set-up, the dynamics of this queue are partially dictated by a stochastic time
dependent regime which can be interpreted as an abstract trade signal (TS). The gain or loss of
a filled LO depends on the regime of the TS: during a gainful regime, a filled LO is likely to be
profitable, but the rate of MO arrivals is low so it takes longer for a LO to be executed; during an
adverse regime, a filled LO is likely to constitute a loss, and the rate of MO arrivals is high so it
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takes less time for a LO to be executed. This behaviour is consistent with what we observe in the
data.
An important feature of our model is that the agent’s impulse control may have a random effect
on the state of the queue. Impulse control problems generally feature the ability for the agent
to dictate the precise state of the system after their impulse. Mathematically this is proposed by
imposing that the state of the system due to the action be a random variable which is measurable at
the time of the impulse. The model proposed here allows for the resulting state to be random from
the perspective of the agent without introducing issues related to measurable random variables.
We then consider the problem of an agent that maximizes her expected utility by optimally choosing
the timing of placing and cancelling her LOs. For simplicity, we restrict the agent to have at most
one LO active in the queue at a single time, and the agent incurs a small fixed cost when she places
or cancels the LO. In order to form her optimal decision, she keeps track of three state variables:
the TS, the queue length, and the queue position of her LO. When she has an LO active in the
queue, she stays in the queue as long as the TS is in a gainful regime. However, it is worthwhile
mentioning that even in an adverse regime the agent may keep an active LO in the queue, or place
a new LO if she does not have an active one. This is because in an adverse regime, the agent may
be willing to wait for her active LO to move forward in the queue so that it is in a good position
by the time the TS becomes gainful. In an adverse regime, the agent optimally balances between
the loss from an executed order and the gain from a good queue position when the TS changes to
a favourable one.
1.1. Literature Review
Our work is related to much of the literature on optimal execution. In the seminal work of Almgren
and Chriss (2001), the authors consider the problem of executing a large portfolio using MOs. Their
work has been generalized in a number of ways, see for example, Alfonsi et al. (2010) and Gatheral
et al. (2012). An alternative approach using LOs is taken by Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008), and
has been extended by Bayraktar and Ludkovski (2011), Gue´ant et al. (2012), Guilbaud and Pham
(2013), and Cartea and Jaimungal (2015). In all the above studies, the actual queuing dynamics
of the LOB are abstracted away. For example, in Almgren and Chriss (2001), Alfonsi et al. (2010),
and Gatheral et al. (2012), the agent does not interact directly with the LOB; instead, her trading
activities generate price impacts, which are assumed to be deterministic functions of the trading
rate. In Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008) and subsequent studies, it is assumed that the agent’s filled
LOs follow a counting process with rate independent of the state of the LOB. In both streams of
literature, the state of the LOB becomes irrelevant. More recent developments incorporate order
flow information as a state variable for the LOB. In Bechler and Ludkovski (2015), order flow
imbalance is assumed to be an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, whereas Cartea et al. (2015a) uses
volume imbalance as a measure for order flow imbalance and model it as a discrete state Markov
chain. In quantifying the profitability of filled LOs, for the purposes of our work we choose the TS
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to be volume imbalance. In general, the TS can be chosen to be any observable quantity which
the agent believes will offer information about the profitability of trades and the dynamics of the
LOB. Our contribution is to quantify when it is beneficial to cancel or place an LO, based on its
queue position and the TS.
Our work is also related to the literature on models for LOB events and queues. This stream of
the literature started with Cont et al. (2010). A simplified version which models only the best
bid and ask can be found in Cont and De Larrard (2013), where its diffusive limit is also derived.
Diffusive limits of queuing model for LOBs are also studied in Lakner et al. (2013), Jaisson et al.
(2015), and Guo et al. (2015). In terms of empirical features, our model is closest to Huang et al.
(2015). Our modeling approach to order book events also has similarities to Bacry et al. (2016)
in which the authors use a multivariate Hawkes process to drive the dynamics of the best bid and
ask queues. The distinction between our work and these previous works is that we investigate a
control problem within the queuing system rather than only investigating the dynamics and other
related quantities.
A closely related work is Lehalle and Mounjid (2016) where the authors also consider an optimal
trading problem in a queuing system, however there are some key differences in our work. First, we
consider both the optimal timing of placing LOs as well as cancelling them, whereas in the other
work they only investigate when it is optimal to cancel an order. Second, we do not model MO
size as a constant, electing instead to model the size as a censored distribution. As suggested by
our empirical study, a large proportion of MOs deplete the queue at the best price. Therefore, if
an agent models MO size as a constant, then she will significantly underestimate the probability of
her LO being executed if its position is far from the front of the queue. This has significant effects
on the agent’s desire to cancel an order even if it is not at the front of the queue.
It is also worthwhile mentioning Maglaras et al. (2014) and Maglaras et al. (2015), who consider
order placement problems under fluid (deterministic) queuing models. Our work is different in
that we have a stochastic queuing model where the queue length is discrete-valued. Moreover, we
incorporate adverse selection risk, so the agent’s executed LOs are not always considered a gain
by earning the spread. Rather, the asset price might move in the direction such that the agent’s
executed LO becomes an instantaneous loss.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some empirical findings on LOB
dynamics. In Section 3 we describe a queuing model which reflects many of our empirical findings
and the agent’s stochastic control problem. In Section 4 we derive and simplify the dynamic
programming equation for the agent’s control problem. Section 5 contains a numerical example
using model parameters calibrated from real data. In Section 6 we prove that the numerical method
we employ to solve the associated system of differential equations converges. Section 7 concludes.
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2. Empirical Analysis
In this section, we present empirical findings that motivate our queuing model in Section 3, including
rate of addition and cancellation of other LOs, rate of MO arrivals, distribution of MO size, and
distribution of replenished queue length. We also choose to use the value of volume order imbalance
as the TS and investigate the magnitude of gain or loss of a filled LO as a function of imbalance.
In general, other TSs can be used if a dependence structure between the signal and other queue
dynamics can be specified.
For each quantity that we investigate, we present our empirical findings and also introduce a
parametric fit of a model to the data. When we demonstrate the optimal strategy in Section 5 we
use the estimated parametric model for all numerical values of parameters. The exact form of the
parametric model we use is essentially arbitrary and in general any form can be used within the
model presented in Section 3, but we have found that our choices capture the essential features
from the data in addition to being relatively straightforward to estimate. For the purposes of this
analysis, we primarily consider only events on the sell side of the LOB, and as such we are concerned
only with market buy orders (MBOs).
The estimation of empirical quantities, parametric fits, and creation of all figures in this section
was performed in 41.5 seconds in Matlab on an Intel Core i7 2.7GHz CPU.
2.1. Data
The data that we analyze is the Nasdaq Historical Total View (ITCH) for the ticker INTC on
Oct 1, 2014, with the first and last half hours of trading removed. The remaining data consists of
772,166 events in total, 280,989 of which occur at the best ask price or improve the best ask price.
A further breakdown of the types of events in the data is presented in Table 1.
Event Type Count Average Frequency (per second)
Best Ask Event 280,989 14.19
Order Placement 142,455 7.19
Order Cancellation 128,973 6.51
Market Buy Order 9,561 0.48
Table 1: A best ask event is any order cancellation that occurs at the best ask price, any sell order placement at the
best ask price or lower, or any market buy order.
We divide all volumes and order sizes by 100, round them to the nearest integer and discard results
that are equal to zero. In other words, we assume that all buy and sell volumes are multiples of 100.
Our choice is based on the observation that a large amount of LOs and MOs have a “round-lot”
size, i.e, sizes that are of multiples of 100. For other equities this typical order size may be different
and should be modified accordingly. See, for example, Cartea et al. (2015b) for more details.
Henceforth it should be understood that any volume quantity is to be interpreted as representing
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a multiple of this “round-lot” size. We denote by Lbt (L
a
t ) ∈ {1, 2, ...} the observed volumes at time
t of LOs posted at the best buy (sell) price. For most of this section, only the sell side of the LOB
is examined. We have removed all events when Lat > 200 (0.7% of all events).
2.2. Volume Imbalance as Trade Signal
As many researchers have pointed out, the imbalance between buy and sell order flows exhibits a
dependence structure with future price changes. There are various ways of measuring order flow
imbalance: Cont et al. (2014) constructs a measure based on net aggregated volumes of buy and
sell orders over a time interval; Cartea et al. (2015a) uses another measure, the volume imbalance,
computed from volumes of LOs posted at the best buy and sell price. Both works show that their
measures of order flow imbalance were significant in predicting price movement, and so we construct
our TS regime from observations of the imbalance process. In this paper, we consider the volume
imbalance as in Cartea et al. (2015a), defined as:
ρt =
Lbt − Lat
Lbt + L
a
t
∈ [−1, 1] . (1)
We construct a three-state regime process Zt which we will interpret as our TS by dividing the
imbalance measure interval [−1, 1] into three subintervals and assigning different values as follows:
1. sell-heavy: ρt ∈ [−1, 0.2]⇒ Zt = 1;
2. neutral: ρt ∈ (0.2, 0.6]⇒ Zt = 2;
3. buy-heavy: ρt ∈ (0.6, 1]⇒ Zt = 3.
As will be shown later, Zt = 1 is considered by the agent a gainful regime, where a filled order is
likely to be profitable; Zt = 3 is considered by the agent an adverse regime where a filled order is
likely to be considered a loss. In interpreting Zt as a TS we shall henceforth refer to these regimes
as gainful, neutral, and adverse.
The choice of the boundaries which define different TS regimes will affect the estimation of other
model parameters which subsequently will dictate the optimal order placement and cancellation
strategy. For example, if the boundary between the sell-heavy and neutral regimes were selected
as 0 instead of 0.2, then some changes to the empirical results below will take place. Since the
sell-heavy regime has decreased in size, the transition rates (as in Figure 1) from the sell-heavy
regime to the neutral and buy-heavy regimes will increase. In addition, both sell-heavy and neutral
regimes would experience increased selling pressure with this redefined boundary, so the distribution
of price changes (as in Figure 5) would exhibit higher probabilities of lower outcomes. This has the
effect of making the sell-heavy and neutral regimes more attractive states to the agent. As such,
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she would be less likely to cancel her order in the neutral regime (cancellation region in Figure 7
shrinks) and more likely to place the order in the sell-heavy regime.
For the purposes of the present work, these boundaries are selected so that when we illustrate the
optimal strategy there will be a clear effect based on the regime state. If this model were used
in practice, other methods could be used to determine these boundaries either subjectively (for
example, to reflect a desired level of trading aggression or passivity based on the risk tolerances of
the agent) or objectively (for example by choosing the bounds symmetrically around 0 such that the
TS is expected to occupy each regime for an equal length of time). In addition it may be desirable
to employ a finer discretization of the TS for practical purposes, but we limit the number to three
in this work in order investigate highlight the effects of queue position on the optimal strategy.
2.2.1. Empirical Estimation
From the definition in (1) we expect dependence between the distribution of queue length Lat and
the regime of the TS Zt. To capture this pattern, we propose letting the rate of transition between
regimes dependent on the queue length. Let λz,z¯,` be the rate of transition from regime z to regime
z¯ (z 6= z¯), when the queue length is ` > 0 (we use the convention λz,z,` = 0 for all z). Our
empirical estimate of λz,z¯,` is found through the following procedure: we denote by NZ(z, z¯, `) the
total number of transitions from z to z¯ when Lat = ` and by T (z, `) the occupation time for which
Lat = ` and Zt = z. Then the empirical estimate of λ
z,z¯,` is
NZ(z, z¯, `)
T (z, `)
.
2.2.2. Parametric Model
We run a Poisson regression NZ(z, z¯, `) ∼ Poisson(λz,z¯,` T (z, `)) with the canonical link function
λz,z¯,` = exp(βZ0,z,z¯ + β
Z
1,z,z¯ `), (2)
for constants βZ0,z,z¯ and β
Z
1,z,z¯ and set these coefficients equal to their maximum likelihood estimates,
and the estimated functions λz,z¯,` are truncated for the highest 1% and the lowest 1% values of
` weighted by occupations time1 and replaced by linear extrapolation. Estimated coefficients are
reported in Table B.6 and B.7.
Figures 1(a) 1(d) show the rates of transition from the gainful to the neutral and adverse regimes
1For each `, we compute fz,` =
Tz,`∑
l Tz,`
, the fraction of time that the queue length is equal to ` when the LOB
is in regime z. The upper and lower truncation thresholds are defined as: ¯`z = min{` :
∑
m≤` fz,m ≥ 0.01} and
`z = max{` :
∑
m≤` fz,m ≤ 0.99}.
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Figure 1: Estimated rate of transition. Points represent the empirically observed transition rate in each regime for
each value of queue length. Curves represent the estimated fit corresponding to equation (2). Note that λz,z,` = 0
for all z, so it is not shown.
(empirical estimates are shown as well as the rates which result from the Poisson regression). Both
rates increase as the queue becomes shorter, an indication that there is an increasing buy pressure,
thus it is more and more likely that we transition to an increasingly adverse regime. Also note that
the transition rate from gainful to neutral is higher than that from gainful to adverse (the jump
which can be interpreted as being of smaller size is more likely to occur). Figures 1(b) and 1(e)
show the transition rates to gainful and adverse regimes from the neutral regime. When the queue
is short, the regime is more likely to become adverse, whereas when the queue becomes long, it is
more likely to become gainful. Similar patterns can be found in Figures 1(c) and 1(f), where the
rates of transition out of the adverse regime are presented.
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Figure 2: The rate of cancellation for different queue length and queue position. For each point (`, y) on the grid,
we calculate the total number of cancellation divided by the total time that the best sell queue length is equal to `.
We then apply Gaussian smoothing to obtain this figure.
2.3. Rate of Cancellation and Addition
2.3.1. Empirical Estimation
We assume that all cancellations and additions are of a unit size2. We denote by λ˜c,z,`,y the rate of
cancellation of an order at position y (0 < y ≤ `) when the queue length is ` and the TS regime
is z (the c in the notation stands for “cancellation”). Queue position y = 1 corresponds to the
front of the queue, and y = ` represents the back. Figure 2 shows the empirical estimates of λ˜c,z,`,y.
Each panel corresponds to a different regime z, and the colour at each point (`, y) represents the
corresponding rate of cancellation λ˜c,z,`,y (lighter colours indicating a higher rate of cancellation).
For each regime, we see that the rate of cancellations depends much more heavily on the position
in the queue, y, than on the total length of the queue, `. Therefore, a reasonable model for LO
cancellation is to assume that λ˜c,z,`,y does not depend on ` and henceforth we use the notation
λ˜c,z,y.
The agent is not concerned with the rate of cancellation of any particular order, but she is concerned
with the total rate of cancellations in front of her order and behind her order. Therefore, we denote
by λc,z,y the total rate of cancellation at or before position y, i.e., λc,z,y =
∑y
k=1 λ˜
c,z,k. For instance,
when the LOB is in regime z, the rate of cancellations happening within the interval (a, b] is
λc,z,b − λc,z,a. We do not attempt to estimate λ˜c,z,y, but below we describe how we estimate the
function λc,z,y.
We begin by taking all events corresponding to LO cancellations in the best sell queue, marked as
(Qcz,i, L
c
z,i)i=1,2,..., where Q
c
z,i is the volume of the i-th cancellation that occurs during regime z and
Lcz,i is the total volume at the best sell price immediately prior to this cancellation. For each level
2The details given here show that the number of additions and cancellations are computed in a volume weighted
fashion. Thus, even though we assume they have unit volume, the resulting intensities of the events will be larger
to compensate for this discrepancy producing roughly equal expected volumes of added and cancelled orders.
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Lcz,i = ` (` = 1, 2, ...) and each regime we denote by N
c(z, `) the aggregate volume of cancelled LOs,
so that we have
N c(z, `) =
∑
i:Lcz,i=`
Qcz,i .
Recall that T (z, `) denotes the occupation time of the state (Zt, L
a
t ) = (z, `). The empirical estimate
of the cancellation rate is then
N c(z, `)
T (z, `)
.
The empirical estimate of the addition rate is computed similarly and equal to
Na(z, `)
T (z, `)
,
where Na(z, `) is the cumulative number of additions defined in the same fashion as N c(z, `).
2.3.2. Parametric Model
We conduct a Poisson regression N c(z, `) ∼ Poisson(λc,z,` T (z, `)) with the canonical link function
λc,z,` = exp(βc0,z + β
c
1,z `), (3)
where βc0,z and β
c
1,z are constants. The above form gives λ
c,z,0 = 0 which will be an important
restriction when we write our full queue model to ensure that when the agent’s order is at the front
of the queue, the rate of cancellations in front of her order is zero. The values of βc0,z and β
c
1,z are
obtained via maximum likelihood estimation.
The rate of addition λa,z,` is estimated through a similar procedure. We assume that
λa,z,` = exp(βa0,z + β
a
1,z `), (4)
for constants βa0,z and β
a
1,z.
Figure 3 shows the estimated rate of addition and cancellation as well as the rates which result
from the Poisson regression. Coefficients are reported in Table B.8.
2.4. Rate of Market Order Arrival
We denote by λm,z,` the rate of MO arrival when the TS is in regime z and the length of the queue
is `. In principle, λm,z,` can depend on both z and `, as in the case for the rate of addition and
10
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Figure 3: Estimated (volume-weighted) rate of addition/cancellation for different queue length. Points represent
empirical estimates and curves represent the fit of the parametric model.
cancellation. However, given the fact that the number of MO events is significantly smaller than
the number of LO additions and cancellations, it is difficult to estimate the dependence of λm,z,`
on `. For example, in the data set we consider here there are only 2, 911 MBOs. In particular,
there are only 556 MBOs when the TS is in the gainful regime. Therefore, to keep the model
parsimonious, we assume that λm,z,` depends on the regime z only and henceforth we denote the
rate of MOs by λm,z. The quantity λm,z can be estimated as
λm,z =
M(z)
T (z)
,
where M(z) is the total number of MBOs when the TS is in regime z and T (z) is the occupation
time of regime z. In our numerical examples we do not use a parametric model as in the previous
sections, but rather use this empirical estimate as the market order arrival rate. Estimated results
are present in Table B.9.
2.5. Distribution of Market Order Size
2.5.1. Empirical Estimation
As documented in a number of studies, it is rare for an MO to walk through the first level of the
LOB (see for example Cartea et al. (2015a)). Here, however, we present another empirical finding:
a non-negligible fraction of MOs deplete the entire queue at the best price. Table 2 shows some
summary statistics on MO size. The column “Average MO size” contains the average size of MBOs
when the queue length is at different intervals. We can see that as the queue length increases, the
average MO size increases as well. The column “% of depletion” contains the proportion of MOs
that deplete the entire queue at the best sell price. Surprisingly, these proportions are very high:
for example, even when the queue length is between [40, 60), which is about 5 times the average
MO size, the probability that an MO depletes the whole queue is 12.1%. Therefore, a realistic
model for MO size should incorporate the probability of an LO being executed even it is far away
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from the front of the queue.
Another observation from Table 2 is that the percentage of MOs depleting the entire queue decreases
as the queue length increases. This suggests that we model the MO size as a random variable right-
censored by the queue length. To validate this hypothesis, we conduct the following bootstrap
exercise. First we estimate the empirical distribution of MO size using the non-parametric Kaplan-
Meier estimator (Kaplan and Meier (1958)), assuming that MO size is indeed right-censored by
the queue length. We then draw independent samples (Q¯bi)i=1,2,... from the estimated empirical
distribution of the MO size and (Lbi)i=1,2,... from the empirical distribution of queue length. Next
we compute the censored MO size Qbi = min{Q¯bi , Lbi} and the summary statistics based on the
bootstrapped dataset (Qbi , L
b
i). The results are shown in Table 3. It can be seen that the summary
statistics in Table 3 are very close to those in Table 2.
Queue Length Average MO size % of depletion
[ 0, 20) 4.5 39.8%
[20, 40) 9.2 14.3%
[40, 60) 10.0 12.1%
[60, 80) 13.6 5.8%
[80, 100) 16.1 4.1%
Table 2: Size of market sell orders (empirical).
Queue Length Average MO size % of depletion
[ 0, 20) 4.3 40.6%
[20, 40) 8.7 14.8%
[40, 60) 11.2 9.5%
[60, 80) 12.8 6.2%
[80, 100) 13.6 3.7%
Table 3: Size of market sell orders (bootstrapped).
2.5.2. Parametric Model
The parametric model we employ in our numerical examples is to model MO size by a negative
binomial distribution which depends on the regime of the TS. In particular, for a fixed regime z
and for each pair of observed MO size and queue length (Qmz,i, L
m
z,i)i=1,2,..., we assume that Q
m
z,i =
min{Q¯mz,i, Lmz,i}, where (Q¯mz,i)i=1,2,... are i.i.d. negative binomial random variables. The parameters
are estimated via maximum likelihood. Figure 4 shows the empirical and the estimated distributions
for the MO size. Estimated parameters are presented in Table B.10.
2.6. Gain/Loss of a Filled Limit Order
The agent’s LO faces different levels of adverse selection risk in different regimes. In our study, we
use θ = Υ−∆dt as a proxy for the agent’s wealth change when her order is filled, where Υ is equal
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Figure 4: Estimated and empirical distribution of MO size. The empirical distributions are estimated using Kaplan-
Meier estimator and the curves are the result of fitting a negative binomial distribution.
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Figure 5: Histogram of best sell price change 100ms after MO arrival conditional on TS regime at the time of the
order.
to the size of a half-tick plus the rebate, multiplied by the size of the agent’s order, and ∆dt is the
change in the best sell price dt seconds after an MBO arrival, multiplied by the size of the agent’s
order. Υ can be interpreted as the agent’s gain from an executed limit order if the fundamental
asset price does not change upon execution. In our numerical example in Section 5, we will use the
empirical distribution of ∆dt for dt = 100 milliseconds.
Figure 5 shows the histogram of best sell price changes 100 milliseconds after the arrival of an MBO.
It is clear that when the TS is in the adverse regime, the best sell price is more likely to move up
after an MBO arrival and the agent suffers more from adverse selection. The time interval of 100
milliseconds is to allow for significant activity of LO additions and cancellations to occur shortly
after the MBO, and this interval may need to be adjusted depending on the asset in question.
In our numerical examples below, we do not use a parametric model to describe this distribution. In
a similar fashion to MO intensity, we use the empirical distribution in Figure 4 as the distribution
of the price change after an MO.
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Figure 6: Empirical distribution of the replenished queue length, and estimated fit of distribution.
2.7. Distribution of Replenished Queue Length
2.7.1. Empirical Estimation
Since we will model only one queue, we must make an assumption of what happens when the entire
queue is depleted, either due to an MO filling the entire queue, or the cancellation of the last LO
in the queue. We will assume that the queue is immediately replenished to a random quantity with
a distribution depending on the regime of the TS. Here we show the empirical distribution of the
volume of the best ask queue immediately after an event depletes the previously best ask queue,
conditional on the TS regime immediately before the depletion.
2.7.2. Parametric Model
We will assume that the replenished queue length is drawn from a distribution µζ,z, which depends
on the regime z. To estimate µζ,z, we fit negative binomial distribution to the empirical distribution
considered in the previous section. Both the empirical distribution and the estimated fit are are
shown in Figure 6. Estimated parameters can be found in Table B.11. This method of modelling
the replenished queue is similar to that of Cont and De Larrard (2013). In that work, new queue
lengths are drawn from a distribution immediately after a price change. Another approach is taken
in Lehalle and Mounjid (2016) where the new queue length is fully determined by the state of
the LOB immediately before the queue depletes. Both of these studies, as well as ours, take this
approach because it allows us to avoid the necessity of modelling the volume process of the queue
at the next price level, significantly reducing the dimensionality of the problem.
3. Model
In this section we propose a model for the queue which encompasses all of the possible events which
may alter its state. Once the set of possible events has been established, the rate at which these
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events occur and the distributions of the changes they cause are chosen to reflect the behaviour
observed in Section 2.
Our construction is non-standard in the sense that our stochastic processes will be indexed by
R × {1, 2} rather than by R as usual. We introduce the notation t¯ = (t, k) where t ∈ R and
k ∈ {1, 2}. We equip the set R × {1, 2} with the lexicographical order, i.e. t¯1 ≺ t¯2 if t1 < t2 or if
t1 = t2 and k1 < k2. We require this construction because at a single instant in time, there may
occur multiple events which must follow a logical sequence. Thus, the first index denoted t is to be
interpreted as the usual flow of continuous time, and the second index denoted k will be used to
construct the proper sequencing of events which occur simultaneously.
The need for this type of construction stems from two sources. First, we model a replenishing of
the queue to a random length when it is depleted by some event, and second, the agent’s action of
cancelling the last LO in the queue will cause the queue to be replenished. The cancellation and
replenishing occur at the same instant in time, but within this particular time we would still like to
interpret the cancellation as occurring first, and we do not want the agent to have foreknowledge
of the replenished length when she cancels her order.
A specific example which illustrates this sequencing of simultaneous events is the following: suppose
there are exactly two LOs active in the queue, the order at the back being the one belonging to
the agent. At time t:
1. The order at the front of the queue is cancelled.
2. Based on the cancellation of the first order, the agent decides to cancel her order.
3. The cancellation of the last order causes the queue to be replenished at a random length.
4. Based on the new length of the queue, the agent decides to place a new LO at the back of
the queue.
This example demonstrates how we would like the decisions of the agent to be based on information
in the queue. The agent’s decision to cancel her order in step 2 is not allowed to depend on the
length of the replenished queue in step 3, but the agent’s decision to replace the order in step 4
is allowed to depend on this quantity. The typical set-up of an impulse control problem gives the
agent perfect knowledge of the effect of her control on the state of the system by stating that the
controlled state is measurable with respect to the stopping time of the impulse. See for example
Bensoussan et al. (1982), Baccarin and Sanfelici (2006), and Ly Vath and Pham (2007). Our
extended indices allow us to circumvent this issue.
Fix a complete filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P,F = (Ft¯)(0,1)t¯(T,2)). In developing the model it
may be useful to consider the filtration G defined by Gt = F(t,1).
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3.1. State Space
The state of the system will be denoted by S = (X,Z, L, Y ), where X represents the agent’s
wealth, Z is the regime of the TS, L is the total length of the queue, and Y is the position of the
agent’s order (should it exist). We set a maximum possible queue length denoted by NL so that
L ∈ {0, 1, . . . , NL}. We allow the length of the queue to be zero, but we will specify the dynamics
such that if L(t,1) = 0, then L(t,2) > 0 due to instantaneous replenishing. In addition, we will always
have Y ∈ {1, . . . , NL,Ξ} where Y = Ξ is a placeholder state which indicates that the agent does
not have an active order. Otherwise we must enforce the constraint Y ≤ L which indicates that
the position of the agent’s order is at most equal to the length of the queue. We denote the set of
feasible states by
S =
{
S = (X,Z, L, Y ) : X ∈ R, Z ∈ {1, . . . , NZ},
L ∈ {0, 1, . . . , NL}, Y ∈ {1, . . . , NL,Ξ}, Y = Ξ or Y ≤ L
}
. (5)
Future sections will involve many conditional statements with respect to the state variable Y . In
order to simplify notation slightly, we adopt the convention that 1k=Ξ = 1k<Ξ = 1k>Ξ = 0 whenever
k ∈ R. That is, statements of the form Ξ = k, Ξ < k, and Ξ > k are interpreted to be false for
k ∈ R.
3.2. Uncontrolled Queue Dynamics
Here we indicate the dynamics of the state given that the agent does not place or cancel any orders.
To this end, for each value of z, z¯ ∈ {1, . . . , NZ} and ` ∈ {1, . . . , NL}, we let N z,z¯,`(t,1) , N c,z,`(t,1) , Na,z,`(t,1) ,
and M z(t,1) be independent Poisson processes adapted to Gt. An arrival of the process N z,z¯,`(t,1) indicates
a change in the TS from z to z¯ at time t. An arrival of N c,z,`(t,1) represents the cancellation of an order
at position ` while the TS is equal to z. An arrival of Na,z,`(t,1) represents the addition of an LO when
the length of the queue is ` in regime z. Lastly, an arrival of M z(t,1) indicates an MO in regime z. We
extend these processes to be defined at all t¯ by setting N z,z¯,`(t,2) = N
z,z¯,`
(t,1) , and similarly for the others.
The interpretation is that these processes may jump at an index of the form (t, 1), but not at one of
the form (t, 2). Staying consistent with the notation of Section 2, the intensities of these processes
are denoted by λz,z¯,`, λ˜c,z,`, λa,z,`, and λm,z. In addition, as before, we have λc,z,` =
∑`
k=1 λ˜
c,z,k.
The quantity λ˜c,z,` represents the rate of cancellation of an order at position ` (if it exists), so λc,z,`
is the rate of cancellation of any order in front of (and including) the one in position `.
We also suppose that for each z and each t we have three random variables z(t,1), θ
z
(t,1), and ζ
z
(t,2),
all of which are independent from all other variables and with distributions µ,z, µθ,z, and µζ,z
respectively. The distribution µ,z is chosen so that z(t,1) is a positive integer, µ
ζ,z is chosen so
that ζz(t,2) is an integer between 1 and N
L, and µθ,z is chosen so that E[e−γθ
z
(t,1) ] < ∞ (γ is the
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agent’s risk aversion parameter which will be introduced later). Note that two of these variables
are defined at time (t, 1), and the third is defined at time (t, 2). This is to emphasize that z(t,1)
and θz(t,1) are F(t,1)-measurable, but ζz(t,2) is F(t,2)-measurable. The need for this will be clear below
when we specify the dynamics of the queue. The interpretation of these quantities is the following:
the value of z(t,1) is the size of an MO that arrives at time t while in regime z. If the agent has an
LO which is filled by an incoming MO, then the change in the agent’s wealth is equal to θz(t,1). The
value of ζz(t,2) will be used as the size of the replenished queue if there is an event at time t which
depletes it.
Let τ¯ = (τ, κ) be a stopping time in the filtration Ft¯ and let ϕ be an Fτ¯ -measurable random
variable taking values in S with the restriction that if L(ϕ) = 0, then κ = 1. We define a sequence
of stopping times ρ¯j = (ρj, kj) and states ϕj as follows: let ρ¯0 = τ¯ and ϕ0 = ϕ, and set
Xu,τ¯ ,ϕρ¯0 = X(ϕ) Z
u,τ¯ ,ϕ
ρ¯0 = Z(ϕ)
Lu,τ¯ ,ϕρ¯0 = L(ϕ) Y
u,τ¯ ,ϕ
ρ¯0 = Y (ϕ)
via the appropriate projection mappings. The superscript u in these quantities is to indicate that
these represent the uncontrolled versions of each process. For the remainder of this subsection we
will suppress the dependence on τ¯ and ϕ of the state variables to reduce clutter in notation. Now
recursively define stopping times by
ρ¯j+1 =
{
(ρj+1, 1), if L
u
ρ¯j
6= 0,
(ρj, 2), if L
u
ρ¯j
= 0,
(6)
where if Luρ¯j 6= 0,
ρj+1 = inf
z¯ 6=Zuρ¯j
6`=Y uρ¯j ,`≤Luρ¯j
{
t > ρj : max{∆N
Zuρ¯j ,z¯,`
t ,∆N
c,Zuρ¯j ,`
t ,∆N
a,Zuρ¯j ,L
u
ρ¯j
t ,∆M
Zuρ¯j
t } = 1
}
, (7)
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and define the state transitioned into at these times by
ϕj+1 =

(
Xuρ¯j , z¯, L
u
ρ¯j
, Y uρ¯j
)
, if ∆N
Zuρ¯j ,z¯,`
ρ¯j+1 = 1, L
u
ρ¯j
6= 0 ,(
Xuρ¯j , Z
u
ρ¯j
, Luρ¯j + 1, Y
u
ρ¯j
)
, if ∆N
a,Zuρ¯j ,L
u
ρ¯j
ρ¯j+1 = 1, L
u
ρ¯j
6= 0 ,(
Xuρ¯j , Z
u
ρ¯j
, Luρ¯j − 1, Y uρ¯j − 1`<Y uρ¯j
)
, if ∆N
c,Zuρ¯j ,`
ρ¯j+1 = 1, L
u
ρ¯j
6= 0 ,(
Xuρ¯j + θ1≥Y uρ¯j , Z
u
ρ¯j
, (Luρ¯j − )1<Luρ¯j ,
(Y uρ¯j − )1<Y uρ¯j + Ξ(1≥Y uρ¯j + 1Y uρ¯j=Ξ)
)
, if ∆M
Zuρ¯j
ρ¯j+1 = 1, L
u
ρ¯j
6= 0 ,(
Xuρ¯j , Z
u
ρ¯j
, ζ,Ξ
)
, if Luρ¯j = 0
(8)
where for the sake of brevity in (8) we have replaced θ
Zuρ¯j
ρ¯j+1 , 
Zuρ¯j
ρ¯j+1 , and ζ
Zuρ¯j
ρ¯j+1 by θ, , and ζ respectively.
We now set:
Xuρ¯j+1 = X(ϕj+1) Z
u
ρ¯j+1
= Z(ϕj+1)
Luρ¯j+1 = L(ϕj+1) Y
u
ρ¯j+1
= Y (ϕj+1)
This construction requires some explanation. The definition given by (6) and (7) corresponds to
the arrival index of the next feasible event. If there is an event that sends L to zero (which must
happen at an index of the form (t, 1) by construction), then the next stopping time is immediate
but occurs at an index of the form (t, 2). If the most recent previous event does not result in L
being sent to zero, then the next event is due to a regime change, MO arrival, LO arrival, or LO
cancellation, and must occur at an index of the form (t, 1). Note that the infimum is taken only
over values of ` corresponding to order positions which are within the queue and not equal to the
agent’s order should it exist, hence the agent’s order can never be exogenously cancelled. Also, by
independence of the Poisson processes, with probability 1 the increments in (7) never coincide, so
the definition in (8) is well defined.
The first two types of events in (8) are rather straightforward. The first type corresponds to a
change in the TS from its previous value of Zρk to the new value of z¯ (by convention we set the
intensity λz,z,` = 0 for all z). The second type corresponds to the addition of a single LO (we set
the intensity of λa,z,N
L
= 0 to enforce Lut¯ ≤ NL).
The third type of event corresponds to a cancellation of the order in position `. This will reduce
the length of the queue by 1 (note that if this results in the queue being depleted, then by (6)
the next stopping time will be ρ¯k+2 = (ρk+1, 2) to allow the queue to be randomly replenished
immediately). If the agent does not have an order in the queue, then this status is unchanged due
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to the cancellation. If the agent does have an active order, then its position decreases by one if the
cancellation occurs in front of the agent’s order. Finally, note that if there is exactly one order in
the queue and the agent has an active order, then an exogenous cancellation cannot occur due to
the definition in (7).
The fourth event type is the arrival of an MO. If the size of the MO (denoted here by ) is large
enough to fill the agent’s order, then the wealth changes by the random value θ. The length of the
queue either decreases by , or if the MO is large enough to deplete the queue then it sends L to
zero (and it will be immediately replenished as described in the third type of event). Finally, if the
MO is not large enough to fill the agent’s LO, then the agent’s position decreases by the size of
the MO. Otherwise, the status of the agent’s order changes to Ξ as the order is filled and removed
from the queue.
The model enforces a constraint that the agent always places orders with volume equal to that of a
single “round-lot” order. In addition, when a market order arrives the agent’s order is either fully
executed or not executed. We have avoided the inclusion of partial executions in this model in
order to focus on the aspects of queuing in the system. It is possible to include partial executions
in the model but this comes with a significant increase in complexity due the the addition of more
state variables. In particular, the volume of the agent’s order becomes a state variable, and the
agent needs to decide not only on the timing of orders but also on their volume. We do not believe
that the inclusion of this feature would significantly change the qualitative behaviour of the optimal
strategy so we have decided to consider only full executions.
The state of the uncontrolled system starting at index τ¯ in state ϕ is then defined as
Su,τ¯ ,ϕt¯ = (Xu,τ¯ ,ϕt¯ , Zu,τ¯ ,ϕt¯ , Lu,τ¯ ,ϕt¯ , Y u,τ¯ ,ϕt¯ ) = ϕj, for ρ¯j  t¯ ≺ ρ¯j+1 (9)
3.3. Controlled Queue Dynamics
The previous subsection outlined how the state of the queue changes if the agent does not intervene.
The agent’s control will be defined by a sequence of stopping times whose effect on the state of
the queue will be outlined here. The full controlled process will then consist of stopping the
uncontrolled queue at times corresponding to the agent’s strategy, then restarting the uncontrolled
queue in a new state defined appropriately by the effect of the agent’s action. We will also describe
the restrictions put on the stopping times to ensure that the agent’s action is feasible.
Let {τ¯j}j≥1 = {(τj, κj)}j≥1 be a sequence of non-decreasing stopping times which represent the
times at which the agent sends a signal to place or cancel an order. We denote the controlled state
by Sct¯ and define it iteratively by setting τ¯0 = (0, 1) and φ0 = Sc(0,1) = (x, z, `, y) ∈ S, and for
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τ¯j  t¯ ≺ τ¯j+1 we set
Sct¯ = (Xct¯ , Zct¯ , Lct¯ , Y ct¯ ) = Su,τ¯j ,φjt¯ . (10)
The superscript c in the processes above indicate that they represent the state of the system when
taking into account the effects of the agent’s control. It remains to define the states φj which
represent the states at which we start the uncontrolled queue immediately after the agent exercises
her control. Let η > 0 be constant which is to reflect a small incremental cost incurred by the
agent for sending a signal. Define the operator A : S→ S by
A(x, z, `, y) =
{
(x− η, z, `+ 1, `+ 1), y = Ξ
(x− η, z, `− 1,Ξ), y 6= Ξ (11)
and then set
φj+1 = A(S
u,τ¯j ,φj
τ¯j+1 ) (12)
The value of A(x, z, `, y) represents the state of the queue once the signal is sent given that the
state is (x, z, `, y) immediately before the signal.
Finally, we impose the following restrictions on {τ¯j}j≥1 = {(τj, κj)}j≥1 :
lim
j→∞
τj > T, (13)
Y
u,τ¯j−1,φj−1
τ¯j = Ξ⇒ Lu,τ¯j−1,φj−1τ¯j < NL (14)
κj =
{
1 if L
u,τ¯j−1,φj−1
τ¯j = 1 and Y
u,τ¯j−1,φj−1
τ¯j = 1,
2 otherwise
(15)
We denote the set of sequences which satisfy these conditions by A. Condition (13) ensures that the
number of signals sent by the agent over the trading period is finite almost surely. This simplifying
assumption will be satisfied automatically by the optimal strategy anyway since the cost satisfies
η > 0. Condition (14) simply states that if the agent does not have an order in the queue, then
she may only place one if the length of the queue is strictly less than the maximum allowable
length. This simplifying assumption could be relaxed in a more generalized framework and is also
convenient for numerical purposes.
Condition (15) is related to the information that the agent has at the time of executing her strategy.
If Lct¯ = Y
c
t¯ = 1, then the agent’s order is the only one in the queue, and cancelling it would send
the length of the queue to zero to be replenished immediately after. We do not wish for the agent’s
strategy to consist of a cancellation when she has foreknowledge of the length of the replenished
queue. Thus, when cancelling at an index of the form t¯ = (t, 1), the queue is replenished at (t, 2)
to the level ζ
Zc
(t,1)
(t,2) , which is an F(t,2) measurable random variable. The agent is then allowed to
replace the order at index (t, 2), depending on the value of ζ
Zc
(t,1)
(t,2) .
20
3.4. Performance Criteria and Optimization
The agent attempts to choose a sequence of stopping times satisfying conditions (13) to (15),
denoted by {τ¯j}j≥1 ∈ A, which maximizes the utility of her terminal wealth. We define the value
function as
H(t¯, x, z, `, y) = sup
{τ¯j}j≥1∈A
E
[
−e−γXc(T,2)
∣∣∣∣Xct¯ = x, Zct¯ = z, Lct¯ = `, Y ct¯ = y] , (16)
where γ is a risk aversion parameter. This utility function will be convenient because it will allow
us to make an ansatz for the form of H and eliminate the variable x from the equations that
are to be solved, reducing the dimensionality of the system. In addition this will have the effect
that the optimal strategy does not depend on the agent’s wealth. We suppose that the dynamic
programming principle holds for any stopping time τ¯  (T, 2):
H(t¯, x, z, `, y) = sup
{τ¯j}j≥1∈A
E
[
H(τ¯ , Xcτ¯ , Z
c
τ¯ , L
c
τ¯ , Y
c
τ¯ )
∣∣∣∣Xct¯ = x, Zct¯ = z, Lct¯ = `, Y ct¯ = y] . (17)
At this point we would like to eliminate the use of the time index notation of the form t¯ = (t, k)
in order to write a more easily readable dynamic programming equation. To this end, suppose
t¯ = (t, 1) on the left hand side of (17) and τ¯ = (t, 2) on the right hand side. If ` > 1 or y = Ξ then
H((t, 1), x, z, `, y) = H((t, 2), x, z, `, y) , (18)
due to (15) (the agent is not allowed to take action at this particular time index, so the uncontrolled
dynamics proceed). On the other hand, if ` = y = 1, then
H((t, 1), x, z, `, y) = max
{
E
[
H((t, 2), x− η, z, ζz(t,2),Ξ)
]
, H((t, 2), x, z, `, y)
}
(19)
where the expectation is taken over the random variable ζz(t,2). Equation (19) carries the intuition
that if the agent is the only one with an order in the queue, then the optimal choice is based on
the relative value of proceeding to the next instant in time with no action versus the average value
to the agent if they were to cancel and generate a random queue length. The form of the first term
within the maximum of (19) is due to the last lines of (6) and (8). By considering both (18) and
(19) we are able to eliminate any use of time index of the form (t, 1) and write the value function
in terms of only (t, 2). With a slight abuse of notation, from this point forward we now denote the
value function by H(t, x, z, `, y) where we are implicitly referring only to the value function at an
expanded time index of the form (t, 2).
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4. Solving for the Value Function and Optimal Strategy
4.1. Dynamic Programming Equation
In this section we write the dynamic programming equation corresponding to the agent’s opti-
mization problem as described above. Due to the drastic difference in the dynamics depending on
whether y = Ξ or y 6= Ξ as well as the restriction ` ≤ NL, we will separate the writing of this
equation into three cases. We first write the equation for y = Ξ and ` < NL. Second, we consider
y = Ξ and ` = NL. Finally, we have the case y 6= Ξ. Recall that we have introduced the notation
λc,z,` =
∑`
k=1 λ˜
c,z,k. This notation will be convenient because any cancellation of an order in front
of the agent’s order, regardless of its position, has the same effect on the agent’s value function.
Similarly for cancellations behind the agent’s order. For the case y = Ξ and ` < NL the dynamic
programming equation is
max
{
∂tH +
∑
z¯ 6=z
λz,z¯,`
(
H(t, x, z¯, `,Ξ)−H
)
+ λm,zE
[
1<`H(t, x, z, `− ,Ξ) + 1≥`H(t, x, z, ζ,Ξ)−H
]
+ λc,z,`
(
1`>1H(t, x, z, `− 1,Ξ) + 1`=1E
[
H(t, x, z, ζ,Ξ)
]
−H
)
(20)
+ λa,z,`
(
H(t, x, z, `+ 1,Ξ)−H
)
;
H(t, x− η, z, `+ 1, `+ 1)−H
}
= 0 .
For the case y = Ξ and ` = NL, the equation takes the form
∂tH +
∑
z¯ 6=z
λz,z¯,N
L
[
H(t, x, z¯, NL,Ξ)−H
]
+ λm,zE
[
1<NLH(t, x, z,N
L − ,Ξ) + 1≥NLH(t, x, z, ζ,Ξ)−H
]
(21)
+ λc,z,N
L
(
H(t, x, z,NL − 1,Ξ)−H
)
= 0 .
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Finally, when y 6= Ξ the equation is
max
{
∂tH +
∑
z¯ 6=z
λz,z¯,`
(
H(t, x, z¯, `, y)−H
)
+ λm,z,` E
[
1<yH(t, x, z, `− , y − ) + 1y≤<`H(t, x+ θ, z, `− ,Ξ)
+ 1≥`H(t, x+ θ, z, ζ,Ξ)−H
]
+ λc,z,y−1
(
H(t, x, z, `− 1, y − 1)−H
)
(22)
+ (λc,z,` − λc,z,y)
(
H(t, x, z, `− 1, y)−H
)
+ λa,z,`
(
H(t, x, z, `+ 1, y)−H
)
;
1`=1E
[
H(t, x− η, z, ζ,Ξ)
]
+ 1`>1H(t, x− η, z, `− 1,Ξ)−H
}
= 0 .
The terminal condition does not depend on the restrictions on the state variables and is given by
H(T, x, z, `, y) = −e−γx . (23)
The expectations in (20) to (22) are taken with respect to the independent random variables , θ,
and ζ with marginal distributions µ,z, µθ,z, and µζ,z respectively. Equation (21) does not take the
form of a quasi-variational inequality because the agent is restricted from adding an order to the
queue when ` = NL.
Each term in the dynamic programming equation has a rather straightforward explanation. We
will focus on giving this for equation (22), the others follow similarly. The max between two terms
represents the optimal decision by the agent whether to cancel her order based on the current value
of the state variables, or to take no action and let the uncontrolled dynamics of the state variables
proceed.
Within the first quantity being compared via the max operator, the summation term represents
the average rate of change of the value function due to regime changes of the TS. The next term
represents the expected rate of change due to the arrival of an MO. Note that there are three
possible outcomes: the MO does not fill the agent’s order (in which case the order moves forward
by the MO size and the queue length decreases), the MO fills the agent’s order (wealth changes
by random quantity and the agent’s order status becomes Ξ), or the MO depletes the entire queue
(the agent’s order is filled and the queue replenished at the random size ζ).
The next two terms represent the expected rate of change due to exogenous LO cancellations.
These may happen either ahead of the agent’s order (with total rate λc,z,y−1) or behind the agent’s
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order (with total rate λc,z,` − λc,z,y). The difference between the two changes in value is that in
one case the agent’s order moves closer to the front of the queue and in the other case the position
stays the same but total queue length still decreases. The final rate term is similar but corresponds
to the addition of a single order to the back of the queue.
The second quantity within the max comparison represents the change in the value function given
that the agent cancels her order. Note that there are again two cases depending on the state of the
queue. If the agent’s order is the only one present (` = 1) then a cancellation will cause the queue
to be replenished at the random length ζ. Otherwise if ` > 1 the queue simply decreases by size 1.
The form of equations (20) to (22) along with the terminal conditions (23) allow us to make the
ansatz H(t, x, z, `, y) = −e−γ(x+h(t,z,`,y)). Making this substitution in the above equations results in
the following: for y = Ξ and ` < NL
min
{
−γ∂th+
∑
z¯ 6=z
λz,z¯,`
(
e−γ(h(t,z¯,`,Ξ)−h) − 1
)
+ λm,z E
[
1<` e
−γ(h(t,z,`−,Ξ)−h) + 1≥` e−γ(h(t,z,ζ,Ξ)−h) − 1
]
+ λc,z,`
(
1`>1 e
−γ(h(t,z,`−1,Ξ)−h) + 1`=1E
[
e−γ(h(t,z,ζ,Ξ)−h)
]
− 1
)
(24)
+ λa,z,`
(
e−γ(h(t,z,`+1,Ξ)−h) − 1
)
;
e−γ(h(t,z,`+1,`+1)−h−η) − 1
}
= 0,
for y = Ξ and ` = NL we have
− γ∂th+
∑
z¯ 6=z
λz,z¯,N
L
(
e−γ(h(t,z¯,N
L,Ξ)−h) − 1
)
+ λm,z E
[
1<NL e
−γ(h(t,z,NL−,Ξ)−h) + 1≥NL e
−γ(h(t,z,ζ,Ξ)−h) − 1
]
(25)
+ λc,z,N
L
(
e−γ(h(t,z,N
L−1,Ξ)−h) − 1
)
,
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and finally for y 6= Ξ we have
min
{
−γ∂th+
∑
z¯ 6=z
λz,z¯,`
(
e−γ(h(t,z¯,`,y)−h) − 1
)
+ λm,z E
[
1<y e
−γ(h(t,z,`−,y−)−h) + 1y≤<` e−γ(θ+h(t,z,`−,Ξ)−h)
+ 1≥`e−γ(θ+h(t,z,ζ,Ξ)−h) − 1
]
+ λc,z,y−1
(
e−γ(h(t,z,`−1,y−1)−h) − 1
)
(26)
+ (λc,z,` − λc,z,y)
(
e−γ(h(t,z,`−1,y)−h) − 1
)
+ λa,z,`
(
e−γ(h(t,z,`+1,y)−h) − 1
)
;
1`=1E
[
e−γ(h(t,z,ζ,Ξ)−h−η)
]
+ 1`>1 e
−γ(h(t,z,`−1,Ξ)−h−η) − 1
}
= 0 .
These equations are subject to terminal conditions
h(T, z, `, y) = 0 . (27)
The form of equations (24) and (26) due to the ansatz allow us to conclude that the agent’s decision
to place and cancel orders does not depend on how much wealth she has accumulated over time
(the equations are independent of x). The decision is only based on the current state of the queue
and market parameters.
4.2. Optimal Strategy
Construction of the optimal strategy follows along the same lines as in other optimal impulse control
problems. We simply need to make some simple modifications due to the form of the indexing set
of our stochastic processes. By inspecting the system of QVI’s (24) to (26), we see that they for
an appropriate choice of functions Fi and Gi they can be written in the form
min
{
Fi(t, h(t), ∂thi(t)) ;Gi(t, h(t))
}
= 0 , (28)
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where i = (z, `, y) indexes the system of equations (the exact form of Fi and Gi will be given later
in Section 6). We then use the system to define a continuation region and an impulse region:
C =
{
(t, z, `, y) : t ≤ T and Gi(t, h(t)) > 0
}
(29)
I =
{
(t, z, `, y) : t ≤ T and Gi(t, h(t)) = 0
}
. (30)
The optimal strategy consists of a sequence of stopping times {τ¯j}∞j=1 = {(τj, κj)}∞j=1 which will be
constructed recursively. By convention we set τ¯0 = (0, 1), then given τ¯j−1 we first define τj as:
τj = inf
{
t ≥ τj−1 : (t, Zu,τ¯j−1,φj−1(t,2) , Lu,τ¯j−1,φj−1(t,2) , Y u,τ¯j−1,φj−1(t,2) ) ∈ I
}
. (31)
Recall that Zu,τ¯j−1,φj−1 , Lu,τ¯j−1,φj−1 , and Y u,τ¯j−1,φj−1 are the uncontrolled processes starting from
index τ¯j−1 in state φj−1. Once τj is defined, κj is chosen based on the state of the queue at time τj
as
κj =
{
1 if L
u,τ¯j−1,φj−1
(τj ,1)
= 1 and Y
u,τ¯j−1,φj−1
(τj ,1)
= 1,
2 otherwise
(32)
This strategy is easily seen to be admissible: {τ¯j}∞j=1 satisfies (13) since with probability 1 there are
a finite number of jumps of each of the Poisson processes N z,z¯,`, N c,z,`, Na,z,`, and M z, so τj =∞
for all sufficiently large j; it satisfies (14) because (t, z, NL,Ξ) /∈ I by the definition Gz,NL,Ξ = ∞
(see Section 6); and it satisfies (15) by virtue of (32).
In the next section we graphically illustrate the continuation and impulse regions.
5. Numerical Examples
The system of equations needed to be solved for the value function are highly coupled and complex.
As is often the case with impulse control problems, we are not able to present closed form expressions
for the value function or the optimal strategy. Thus, in order to investigate the qualitative behaviour
of the optimal strategy as it depends on the state of the queue, we must resort to numerical solutions.
In this section, we present numerical results that demonstrates the agent’s optimal strategy (in
discussing the intuition behind the results we will always interpret the queue as being on the sell
side of the LOB).
5.1. Parameters
We use volume imbalance to construct the trade signal Zt (see Subsection 2.2). Most parameters,
including the rate of addition and cancellation (λa,z,` and λc,z,`), the rate of transition between
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regimes (λz,z¯,`), the rate of MO arrival (λm,z), the distribution of MO size (µ,z), the distribution of
gain/loss of a filled LO (µθ,z), and the distribution of replenished queue length (µζ,z) are described
in Section 2.
In all examples below we select the constant T = 50 seconds as the length of the trading period.
This is done because the boundary between the continuation region and impulse region reaches a
steady state when t is far from T . In our numerical examples we find that 50 seconds is sufficiently
large. Using a larger value of T would not change the optimal strategy at time t = 0.
We also set the constant Υ = 0.5. Recall that Υ represents the instantaneous profit of a filled
LO if the underlying fundamental price does not change after execution. If the midprice is seen as
a representation of the fundamental price of the stock, then the instantaneous profit is the half-
spread. The smallest possible value of the spread is 1, and for large tick stocks (such as INTC)
nearly all of the trading time during the day observes a spread of 1.
The parameters γ and η are subjective and can change between different agents. For this reason
we briefly investigate how the optimal strategy changes depending on these two parameters in this
section. For a single set of parameters the computation of the optimal strategy was performed in
2,046 seconds in Matlab on an Intel Core i7 2.7GHz CPU.
5.2. The Optimal Strategy
Figure 7 shows the optimal switching regions when the agent has an active LO (y 6= Ξ). The left
panel shows both the switching region and the continuation region when the TS is in the neutral
regime (Zt = 2) and the right panel shows these regions when the TS is in the adverse regime
(Zt = 3). The switching region (represented by yellow colouring in both panels) indicates when it
is optimal to cancel an existing LO rather than let it remain in the queue. When the TS is in the
gainful regime (Zt = 1), the agent will never cancel an existing LO, so the figure is omitted.
There are several features of these figures which are worthy of discussion. First, for both panels, we
can see that if we fix any queue position Yt, as the queue length Lt decreases, the agent eventually
changes her strategy from keeping the order to cancelling once a threshold for Lt is crossed. There
are two intuitive reasons for this. First, as the length of the queue decreases, the rate of transition
to the gainful regime decreases as well, making the choice to remain in the queue more risky (see
Figure 1). Second, the agent has an incentive to cancel the order to avoid adverse selection when
not in the gainful regime, but if she does and the TS becomes favourable shortly after, then she
would like to put the order back in the queue and she has needlessly sacrificed her queue position.
However, if the total queue length is shorter, than this sacrifice becomes less significant to the point
where it is worth giving up the position to avoid adverse selection, but not difficult to replace the
order in the case that the TS becomes gainful again after cancelling.
Second, we see that the switching regions in Figure 7 are not monotone in the queue position Yt.
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Figure 7: Optimal strategy when t = 0 and Yt 6= Ξ. Other parameters are η = 10−4 and γ = 0.4. The yellow
region indicates where the agent’s optimal policy is to cancel her order. The blue region indicates where she takes
no action. The red curve represents the position in the queue as a function of its total length which maximizes the
agent’s value function.
For example, on the right panel, when the queue length Lt is around 40, the agent will cancel her
LO when Yt is close to 0 and when Yt is close to Lt; in between, she stays in the queue. The
reasoning for this is similar to the second line of intuition above. When the agent’s order is at the
back of the queue and there is a small level of risk to being filled by an MO, the agent may simply
cancel the order since there is essentially no sacrifice to queue position, and replace the order if the
TS becomes favourable shortly after. As the order moves slightly closer to the front, the sacrifice
of queue position eventually outweighs the risk of adverse selection, so the agent retains her order
in the queue. The value of this queue position will increase if the TS changes to a favourable state.
With a further move towards the front of the queue, the risk of adverse selection becomes imminent
as most MOs are certain to fill her LO.
Although the switching regions in the two panels of Figure 7 look similar, the actual frequency of
switching can be quite different. This is because the distribution of queue length is different for
the different regimes. From Figure 8, we can see that when the regime is neutral, the distribution
of queue length peaks at around 40; whereas when the regime is adverse, the distribution peaks
at somewhere between 10 and 20. The implication of this is that in the adverse regime, the agent
almost always cancels an LO and in the neutral regime, there is some proportion of time that the
agent stays in the queue.
Lastly, we also plot the position in the queue in terms of its total length which maximizes the
agent’s value function. Precisely stated, the red curve corresponds to:
y∗(t, Zt, Lt) = arg max
y≤Lt
h(t, Zt, Lt, y) .
We only plot the curve within the continuation region, since every position within the cancellation
region would have the same value to the agent. In the gainful regime, the most valuable position
to the agent is the front of the queue, so this is also not displayed. Of particular significance is
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Figure 8: Distribution of queue length in different regimes. The solid lines are the simulation results from our
queuing model. The dashed lines are the empirical distributions.
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Figure 9: Optimal strategy when Yt = Ξ and t = 0. Other parameters are η = 10
−4 and γ = 0.4.
the fact that there are certain states in which the front of the queue is not considered the most
valuable. This is another illustration of the trade-off between the adverse selection suffered by
being filled by an MO and the desire to be near the front of the queue in preparation for when
the regime becomes gainful. When the queue length becomes sufficiently long the front position is
always the most valuable. This stems from the fact that a longer queue indicates a higher rate of
regime change into a gainful regime to the point where this is more likely to occur before the next
MO (see Figure 1).
Figure 9 shows the optimal strategy as a function of Lt when the agent does not have an active LO
(Yt = Ξ). When the LOB is in the gainful regime, the agent always places a new LO immediately.
When the LOB is in the neutral or adverse regime, the agent will place an order when the length of
the queue is above a certain threshold. The agent does not enter the queue when it is short because
she wants to avoid the risk of adverse selection, but when the queue is long this risk is reduced
and it is worth placing the order to ensure a good position before the TS changes to a favourable
regime. As expected, and the threshold for placing the order in the adverse regime is higher than
that in the neutral regime.
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Figure 10: Optimal strategy when t = 0 and Yt 6= Ξ. Other parameters are η = 10−3 and γ = 0.4. The difference
in the parameters from Figure 7 is that η is 10 times larger.
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lt
not posted
Lt + 1
gainful
neutral
adverse
Figure 11: Optimal strategy when t = 0 and Yt = Ξ. Other parameters are η = 10
−3 and γ = 0.4. The difference
in the parameters from Figure 9 is that η is 10 times larger.
5.3. Increasing Transaction Cost
Figures 10 and 11 show the optimal strategy when the transaction cost η is increased to 10−3.
Figure 10 shows the switching (yellow) region when the agent has an active LO. We can see that
comparing to Figure 7, the yellow regions are smaller and the blue regions are larger. This is
expected as the agent has less incentive to cancel her existing LO. Similarly, Figure 11 shows the
agent’s action when she does not have an active LO. When comparing to Figure 9 in all regimes,
particularly the gainful regime, we see that the agent is less likely to place a new LO. Of particular
interest is the fact that the agent will not post an order in the gainful regime when the queue is
short. This may seem counter-intuitive at first, but it is due to the fact that the rate of transition
to the adverse and neutral regimes increase as the queue length decreases. If the agent places an
LO and the queue switches to one of the other two regimes, she will likely be in the cancellation
region (yellow region in Figure 10). When she cancels, she incurs another transaction cost. To
avoid this situation, her optimal strategy is not to enter the queue when it is very short in the
gainful regime. As the queue becomes longer she becomes willing to place her order because even
in a longer queue there is a significant change that an MO fills her order, but less chance that the
regime changes before this occurs. In summary, when the transaction cost η increases, the agent is
less likely to either cancel or place an LO.
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Figure 12: Optimal strategy and most valuable queue position when t = 0 and Yt 6= Ξ. Other parameters are
η = 10−3 and γ = 1.2. The difference in the parameters from Figure 7 is a larger value of γ.
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Figure 13: Optimal strategy when t = 0 and Yt = Ξ. Other parameters are η = 10
−3 and γ = 1.2. The difference
in the parameters from Figure 9 is a larger value of γ.
5.4. Increasing Risk-Aversion
Figure 12 and Figure 13 demonstrate the optimal strategy when the agent is more risk averse
(γ = 1.2 increased from γ = 0.4 in the previous examples). Comparing Figure 12 to Figure 7,
the yellow region is much larger because the agent is more inclined to cancel her LO to avoid the
risk associated with adverse selection. Similarly, comparing Figure 13 to Figure 9, we see that the
thresholds to place a new LO have increased to avoid the risk of having LOs active during the
presence of an undesirable TS.
5.5. Decreasing Risk-Aversion
Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the optimal strategy for the agent when she less risk-averse (γ = 0.1).
Comparing Figures 14 and 15 to Figures 7 and 9 show typical expected behaviour through the fact
that the agent is in all cases more willing to have active LOs, hence the strategy is more aggressive.
Note again the presence of non-monotonicity of the strategy with respect to queue position Yt when
the TS is adverse.
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Figure 14: Optimal strategy and most valuable queue position when t = 0 and Yt 6= Ξ. Other parameters are
η = 10−3 and γ = 0.1. The difference in the parameters from Figure 7 is a smaller value of γ.
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Figure 15: Optimal strategy when t = 0 and Yt = Ξ. Other parameters are η = 10
−3 and γ = 0.1. The difference
in the parameters from Figure 9 is a smaller value of γ.
5.6. Simulation
In this section we attempt to quantify how the incorporation of queue length and order position
into the optimal decision policy benefits the agent when compared to the performance of various
strategies which only consider the value of the TS. We do this by simulating the dynamics of
the queue according to the model outlined in Section 3. We simulate 106 sample paths using the
parameters η = 10−4, Υ = 0.5 and T = 50 seconds. The initial state of the regime Z0 is randomly
drawn from the empirical distribution of Zt, and the initial queue length L0 is drawn from the
empirical distribution µζ,z, conditioning on z = Z0. The agent starts with zero wealth and no
active LO, i.e., X0 = 0 and Y0 = Ξ. The four different order placement strategies which we test in
these simulations are outlined below.
• Optimal : the optimal strategy (as defined by cancel regions, continue regions, and new order
thresholds) with risk aversion parameter γ varying from 0.1 to 1.27.
• Passive Benchmark : the agent places a new order whenever the TS becomes gainful, and
cancels the order whenever the TS becomes neutral or adverse.
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Figure 16: Risk-reward plot. Along the curve indicating performance of the optimal strategy, the right-most point
represents γ = 0.1. Increasing γ lowers both the mean and standard deviation of terminal wealth.
• Aggressive Benchmark : the agent places a new order whenever the TS becomes gainful or
neutral, and cancels the order whenever the TS becomes adverse.
• Always-post : the agent never cancels her order and always replaces it when it is filled by an
MO.
Figure 16 shows the risk-reward plot for all the strategies. The horizontal axis is the standard
deviation of the agent’s terminal wealth and the vertical axis is her mean terminal wealth. The
blue curve represents the performance of the optimal strategy for various values of the risk-aversion
parameter. From the figure, we see the always-post strategy clearly shows poor performance com-
pared to the other strategies. Even though the always-post action is likely to occupy order positions
which are at the front of the queue for a greater proportion of time than the other strategies, pre-
vious analysis and reasoning indicates that such a position can have negative value to the agent if
there is a high chance of being filled by an MO and suffering adverse selection.
Table 4 compares some of the optimal strategies for different risk aversion parameters with aggres-
sive benchmark. The optimal strategy when γ = 0.1 and aggressive benchmark have very similar
standard deviations for the terminal wealth; but the optimal strategy has a mean terminal wealth
of 2.23, which is 2.5% higher than aggressive benchmark. When γ = 0.4, the optimal strategy and
aggressive benchmark have very similar means, but the standard deviation of the optimal strategy
is 1.825, which is 8.8% lower.
Strategy Mean Std
γ = 0.1 2.230 1.976
γ = 0.4 2.182 1.825
Aggressive Benchmark 2.175 1.979
Table 4: Mean and standard deviation of terminal wealth.
To better understand the differences between these strategies, let us have a look at Figure 17,
which shows the histograms of terminal wealth for all strategies. Panel (d) shows the case for
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Figure 17: Histogram of terminal wealth.
the naive always-post strategy. Its terminal wealth has a lot of variation, with a large number
of samples being negative. Panel (c) shows the case for aggressive benchmark. Compared to the
always-post strategy, aggressive benchmark is more conservative: the variance is smaller and there
are fewer samples ending up with negative wealth. Panel (b) shows the case for passive benchmark,
which seems to be much more conservative than the rest. Panel (a) shows the case for the optimal
strategy (γ = 0.4). We can see that its variance lies in between passive benchmark and aggressive
benchmark. Table 5 shows the proportions of LOs executed as three regimes for the four strategies.
The always-post strategy has a large fraction of LOs (21.1%) executed at the adverse regime.
Passive benchmark goes the other extreme, with all LOs being executed at the gainful regime. For
the optimal strategy, we see that there is only a tiny fraction of LOs (0.2%) executed at the adverse
regime. Compared to aggressive benchmark, there are relatively more LOs executed at the gainful
regime.
Strategy z = 1 z = 2 z = 3 number of filled orders
optimal (γ = 0.4) 76.5 23.3 0.2 9.85
passive benchmark 100.0 0.0 0.0 2.43
aggressive benchmark 64.0 36.0 0.0 11.91
always post 45.1 33.7 21.1 17.64
Table 5: Percentages of orders executed in each regime.
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6. Convergence Results
In this section, we show that the system of QVIs (24) to (26) admits a unique solution and provide
a numerical scheme that converges to this solution.
We denote by S¯ the reduced state space, equivalent to that of (5) without the X component:
S¯ =
{
i = (Z,L, Y ) : Z ∈ {1, . . . , NZ}, L ∈ {0, 1, . . . , NL},
Y ∈ {1, . . . , NL,Ξ}, Y = Ξ or Y ≤ L
}
. (33)
This is the set of state variables of concern with respect to equations (24) to (26). We also write
RS¯ = {ri : ri ∈ R, i ∈ S¯}. With the above notations, the original system of QVIs can be restated as
Ji(t, u, ∂tui) = min {Fi(t, u, ∂tui);Gi(t, u)} = 0 ,
ui(T ) = 0 ,
(34)
for i ∈ S¯ and u : [0, T ] → RS¯. In other words, we are viewing the original system of QVIs as a
system indexed by i ∈ S¯. The mappings Fi and Gi in (34) are defined as
Fz,`,Ξ(t, r, p) = −γp+
∑
z¯ 6=z
λz,z¯,`
(
e−γ(rz¯,`,Ξ−rz,`,Ξ) − 1)
+ λm,z,`
(
E
[
1<`e
−γ(rz,`−,Ξ−rz,`,Ξ) + 1≥`e−γ(rz,ζ,Ξ−rz,`,Ξ)
]
− 1
)
+ λc,z,`
(
1`>1e
−γ(rz,`−1,Ξ−rz,`,Ξ) + 1`=1E
[
e−γ(rz,ζ,Ξ−rz,`,Ξ)
]
− 1
)
+ λa,z,`
(
e−γ(rz,`+1,Ξ−rz,`,Ξ) − 1
)
,
Gz,`,Ξ(t, r) = e
−γ(rz,`+1,`+1−rz,`,Ξ−η) − 1 ,
for i = (z, `,Ξ) with ` < NL, as
Fz,NL,Ξ(t, r, p) = −γp+
∑
z¯ 6=z
λz,z¯,N
L
(
e−γ(rz¯,NL,Ξ−rz,NL,Ξ) − 1
)
+ λm,z,N
L
(
E
[
1<NLe
−γ(r
z,NL−,Ξ−rz,NL,Ξ) + 1≥NLe
−γ(rz,ζ,Ξ−rz,NL,Ξ)
]
− 1
)
+ λc,z,N
L
(
e−γ(rz,NL−1,Ξ−rz,NL,Ξ) − 1
)
,
Gz,NL,Ξ(t, r) =∞ ,
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for i = (z,NL,Ξ), and as
Fz,`,y(t, r, p) = −γp+
∑
z¯ 6=z
λz,z¯,`
(
e−γ(rz¯,`,y−rz,`,y) − 1
)
+ λm,z,`
(
E
[
1<ye
−γ(rz,`−,y−−rz,`,y) + 1y≤<`e−γ(θ+rz,`−,Ξ−rz,`,y)
+ 1≥`e−γ(θ+rz,ζ,Ξ−rz,`,y)
]
− 1
)
+ λc,z,y−1
(
e−γ(rz,`−1,y−1−rz,`,y) − 1
)
+ (λc,z,` − λc,z,y)
(
e−γ(rz,`−1,y−rz,`,y) − 1
)
+ λa,z,`
(
e−γ(rz,`+1,y−rz,`,y) − 1
)
,
Gz,`,y(t, r) = 1`=1E
[
e−γ(rz,ζ,Ξ−rz,`,y−η)
]
+ 1`>1e
−γ(rz,`−1,Ξ−rz,`,y−η) − 1 .
for i = (z, `, y) with y 6= Ξ. We define Gz,NL,Ξ(t, r) = ∞ so that the QVI (34) reduces to
Fz,NL,Ξ(t, u, ∂tui) = 0.
Our first result is the following comparison principle for (34), which ensures the uniqueness of the
solution.
Theorem 1. Let u be a bounded upper-semi-continuous subsolution and v a bounded lower-semi-
continuous supersolution of (34), then u ≤ v.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
For (z, `,Ξ) ∈ S¯ with ` < NL and φ ∈ C1([0, T ]) we provide the following finite difference scheme:
F∆z,`,Ξ(t, r, φ) = γ
φ(t)− rz,`,Ξ
∆
+
∑
z¯ 6=z
λz,z¯,`
(
e−γ(rz¯,`,Ξ−rz,`,Ξ) − 1
)
+ λm,z,`
(
E
[
1<`e
−γ(rz,`−,Ξ−rz,`,Ξ) + 1≥`e−γ(rz,ζ,Ξ−rz,`,Ξ)
]
− 1
)
+ λc,z,`
(
1`>1e
−γ(rz,`−1,Ξ−rz,`,Ξ) + 1`=1E
[
e−γ(rz,ζ,Ξ−rz,`,Ξ)
]
− 1
)
+ λa,z,`
(
e−γ(rz,`+1,Ξ−rz,`,Ξ) − 1
)
,
Gz,`,Ξ(t, r, φ) = e
−γ(rz,`+1,`+1−φ(t)−η) − 1 .
36
The obvious analogous expressions are used for all cases in S¯ that remain.
Here ∆ = T/N is the size of time steps where N is a positive integer. We denote by T∆ = {tj :=
∆j : 0 ≤ j ≤ N} the set of grid points for the finite difference scheme. Consider the following
discrete problem:
J∆i (tj, u
∆(tj+1), u
∆
i ) = min
{
F∆i (tj, u
∆(tj+1), u
∆
i ) ;Gi(tj, u
∆(tj+1), u
∆
i )
}
= 0, (35a)
u∆i (T ) = 0, (35b)
for i ∈ S¯, 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1 and u∆ : [0, T ]→ RS . We will show that the solution to (35) can be used
to approximate the solution to (34). To proceed we first need the following results.
Proposition 2. (Stability)
Let ∆ be sufficiently small and u∆ be the solution to (35). For any i = (z, `, y) ∈ S¯, we have
ui(tj) ≤ A(T − tj) , (36)
ui(tj) ≥ 0 , y = Ξ, (37)
ui(tj) ≥ −η , y 6= Ξ, (38)
where A > 0 is a constant.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 3. (Monotonicity)
Consider functions u : [0, T ]→ RS¯ and v : [0, T ]→ RS¯, satisfying Cmin ≤ u ≤ v ≤ Cmax, for some
constants Cmin and Cmax. Suppose for some i ∈ S¯, we have ui ≤ vi and uj = vj for j 6= i; and for
some t ∈ [0, T ], we have ui(t) = vi(t). Then
J∆i (t, u(t
′), ui)− J∆i (t, v(t′), vi) ≥ 0 (39)
for all t′ ∈ [0, T ] and ∆ sufficiently small.
Proof. See Appendix A.3
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Proposition 4. (Consistency)
Fix i ∈ S¯. For δ > 0, t ∈ [0, T ] and any family of continuous functions Φ ∈ C0([0, T ],R) with
continuously differentiable i-th component Φi, we have
∣∣J∆i (t,Φ(t+ ∆),Φi)− Ji(t,Φ(t),Φi(t))∣∣ ≤ o(∆), (40)
where o(∆)→ 0 as ∆→ 0.
Proof. Immediately follows from the fact that Φi is continuous and
Φi(t)− Φ(t+ ∆)
∆
→ ∂tΦi(t),
as ∆→ 0. 
With the above results, we are now ready to prove the convergence of our numerical scheme.
Proposition 5. Let u∆ be the solution to (35) and let u be the solution to (34). Then u∆ → u as
∆→ 0.
Proof. We define the following limits.
u(t) = lim inf
∆→0,t′→t
u∆(t′), u¯(t) = lim sup
∆→0,t′→t
u∆(t′).
Proposition 2 ensures the above limits are well-defined. Following Barles and Souganidis (1991)
and Briani et al. (2012), it suffices to show that u is a supersolution and u¯ is a subsoltion to (34).
Then by comparison principle (Theorem 1), u¯ ≤ u. The opposite inequality is obviously true and
we have u¯ = u = lim∆→0 u∆.
We will prove that u¯ is a subsolution (the proof for u being a supersolution is similar). Let φ be a
smooth function and i ∈ S¯ such that u¯i − φ has a strict global maximum at t0 and u¯i(t0) = φ(t0).
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Standard arguments imply that there exists sequences ∆n → 0 and tn → 0 such that u∆ni − φ has
a local maximum at tn and u
∆n(tn)→ u¯i(t0) as n→∞.
Set δn := (u
∆n
i − φ)(tn) and define the function Φn(t) = {Φnj (t)}j∈S¯
Φnj (t) =
 φ(t) + δn j = i,u∆j (t) j 6= i.
We have
0 = J∆ni (tn, u
∆n(tn + ∆n), u
∆n
i )
≥ J∆ni (tn,Φn(tn + ∆n),Φni )
= Ji(tn, φ(tn + ∆n) + δn, ∂tφ(tn)) + o(∆n),
where the second line follows from Proposition 3 and the third line follows from Proposition 4.
Sending n→∞, we have the required result. 
7. Conclusion
Using tick level data from the Nasdaq exchange, we conduct an empirical study on various limit
order book events, including dynamics of volume imbalance, gain/loss of a filled limit order, rate
of addition and cancellation, rate of market order arrival, distribution of market order size and
distribution of replenished queue length. We propose novel ways of modeling cancellation position
of limit orders and distribution of market order size. Based on our empirical findings, we develop a
queuing model that captures stylized facts on limit order book data. One important feature of our
model is that the dynamics of the limit order book depends on the regime, which is a function of
volume imbalance. Moreover, an executed limit order is more likely to be considered a gain (loss)
by the agent when the limit order book is at a gainful (adverse) regime.
We show how to apply our proposed queuing model in the context of algorithmic trading. We
consider the problem of an agent maximizes her expected utility by placing and canceling limit
orders in such queuing model. In our set up, the agent tries to let more of her limit orders executed
at a gainful regime and less of her limit orders executed at an adverse regime. We demonstrate
our result using a numerical example, in which parameters are calibrated from real data. Our
result shows that even at an adverse regime, the agent might still be willing to stay in the queue
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if she already has an active limit order, or place a new limit order if she does not have one. This
is because the agent tries to obtain a good queue position when the regime switches to a gainful
one. It also implies that strategies that only look at regimes are sub-optimal. Simulation study
shows that the optimal strategy achieve a 2.4% higher mean terminal wealth than the benchmark
strategy that only looks at regimes, given the same level of standard deviation of terminal wealth;
or 11.4% lower standard deviation given the same level of mean terminal wealth.
Appendix A. Proofs
Appendix A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Consider u˜ = (1 + δ)u− δA(T − t), where 0 < δ < 1 and A > 0 is a constant to be fixed
later. We first show that u˜ is a subsolution to
Ji(t, u˜, ∂tu˜i) ≤ −δC (A.1)
for i ∈ S¯ and some constant C > 0, independent of the choice of δ.
We will show (A.1) for the case i = (z, `,Ξ). Showing the case i = (z, `, y) with y 6= Ξ is similar.
Let φ(t) be a smooth test function and t0 < T be such that u˜i(t) − φ(t) attains maximum at t0.
The subsolution property of u implies either of the following
Fi
(
t0, u(t0),
∂tφ(t0)− Aδ
1 + δ
)
≤ 0, (A.2)
Gi(t0, u(t0)) ≤ 0. (A.3)
Suppose (A.2) holds. Without loss of generality, we assume that λz,z¯,` = λm,z,` = λc,z,` = 0. The
case where these are strictly positive can be treated similarly. Multiplying (A.2) by 1 + δ and
re-arranging the terms, we have
−γ∂tφ(t0) + λa,z,`
(
e−γ(uz,`+1,Ξ(t0)−uz,`,Ξ(t0)) − 1) ≤ −λa,z,` (e−γ(uz,`+1,Ξ(t0)−uz,`,Ξ(t0)) − 1) δ − γAδ.
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Using the fact that u is bounded, we can conclude that there exists a constant C1 such that
−γ∂tφ(t0) + λa,z,`
(
e−γ(uz,`+1,Ξ(t0)−uz,`,Ξ(t0)) − 1) ≤ (C1 − γA)δ. (A.4)
From (A.4) we have
Fz,`,Ξ(t0, u˜(t0), ∂tφ(t0)) ≤ (C1 − γA)δ + λa,z,`e−γ(u˜z,`+1,Ξ(t0)−u˜z,`,Ξ(t0))
(
1− eγδ(uz,`+1,Ξ(t0)−uz,`,Ξ(t0)))
≤ (C1 − γA)δ − λa,z,`e−γ(1+δ)(uz,`+1,Ξ(t0)−uz,`,Ξ(t0))(uz,`+1,Ξ(t0)− uz,`,Ξ(t0))γδ,
≤ (C2 − γA)δ , (A.5)
for some constant C2. In the second inequality we use the fact e
x ≥ x + 1 for all x. In the third
inequality we use the fact that u and δ are bounded. Choosing A > C2
γ
, we have
Fz,`,Ξ(t0, u˜(t0), ∂tφ(t0)) ≤ −C3δ, (A.6)
for some constant C3 > 0.
For the case where λz,z¯,`, λm,z,` and λc,z,` are nonzero, the same argument applies: on the right-
hand-side of inequalities (A.4) and (A.5), we would have different constants C1 and C2. The rest
of the proof is the same.
If (A.3) holds we have uz,`+1,`+1(t0)− uz,`,Ξ(t0) ≥ η and
Gz,`,Ξ(t0, u˜(t0)) = e
−γ(uz,`+1,`+1(t0)−uz,`,Ξ(t0)−η)e−γδ(uz,`+1,`+1(t0)−uz,`,Ξ(t0)) − 1
= Gz,`,Ξ(t0, u(t0))e
−γδ(uz,`+1,`+1(t0)−uz,`,Ξ(t0)) + e−γδ(uz,`+1,`+1(t0)−uz,`,Ξ(t0)) − 1
≤ e−γδ(uz,`+1,`+1(t0)−uz,`,Ξ(t0)) − 1
≤ −δe−γηγη. (A.7)
Since either (A.6) or (A.7) holds, by choosing C = min{C3, γηe−γη}, we have shown that u˜ is a
subsolution to (A.1).
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In order to prove u ≤ v, it suffices to show
max
i∈S¯
sup(u˜i − vi) ≤ 0, (A.8)
for all δ > 0. The required result can be obtained by sending δ to 0.
Let us show (A.8) by contradiction. Suppose there exists some δ > 0 and i∗ ∈ S¯ such that
M := max
i∈S¯
sup
t
(u˜i − v0i ) = sup
t
{u˜i∗(t)− vi∗(t)} > 0.
Clearly, u˜i∗ − vi∗ attains its maximum M at some t¯ ∈ [0, T ), and we can assume without loss of
generality that t¯ > 0. Consider the following class of test functions
Φα(t, s) = u˜i∗(t)− vi∗(s)− α|t− s|2,
with α > 0. By standard argument, we have
tα, sα → t¯ ,
Mα = sup Φα = Φα(tα, sα)→M ,
as α→∞, where (tα, sα) is the maximizer of Φα.
Without loss of generality, we assume that i∗ = (z∗, `∗,Ξ). The case for i∗ = (z∗, `∗, y∗) with y∗ 6= Ξ
can be shown using a similar argument. By the viscosity solution property of u˜ and v, we have
min {Fz∗,`∗,Ξ(tα, u˜(tα),−2α(tα − sα)) ;Gz∗,`∗,Ξ(tα, u˜(tα))} ≤ −Cδ,
min {Fz∗,`∗,Ξ(sα, v(sα),−2α(tα − sα)) ;Gz∗,`∗,Ξ(sα, v(sα))} ≥ 0.
The above two inequalities imply either of the following
Fz∗,`∗,Ξ(tα, u˜(tα),−2α(tα − sα))− Fz∗,`∗,Ξ(sα, v(sα),−2α(tα − sα)) ≤ −δC, (A.9)
Gz∗,`∗,Ξ(tα, u˜(tα))−Gz∗,`∗,Ξ(sα, v(sα)) ≤ −δC. (A.10)
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Note that for any (z, `,Ξ), we have
lim inf
α→∞
e−γ(u˜z,`,Ξ(tα)−u˜z∗,`∗,Ξ(tα)) − e−γ(vz,`,Ξ(sα)−vz∗,`∗,Ξ(sα))
= lim inf
α→∞
(
e−γ(u˜z,`,Ξ(tα)−vz,`,Ξ(sα)) − e−γ(u˜z∗,`∗,Ξ(tα)−vz∗,`∗,Ξ(sα))) e−γ(vz,`,Ξ(sα)−u˜z∗,`∗,Ξ(tα))
≥ lim inf
α→∞
(
e−γ(u˜z,`,Ξ(tα)−vz,`,Ξ(sα)) − e−γ(u˜z∗,`∗,Ξ(tα)−vz∗,`∗,Ξ(sα)))C4
≥
(
e−γ(u˜z,`,Ξ(t¯)−vz,`,Ξ(t¯)) − e−γ(u˜z∗,`∗,Ξ(t¯)−vz∗,`∗,Ξ(t¯))
)
C4
≥ 0,
where C4 > 0 is a constant. (A similar result hold for (z, `, y) with y 6= Ξ.) Using the above
inequality, we can conclude that as α → ∞, the lim inf of the l.h.s of (A.9) and the lim inf of the
l.h.s. of (A.10) are both nonnegative, a contradiction. 
Appendix A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We prove by induction backwards in tj. Without loss of generality, we assume that
λz,z¯,` = λm,z,` = λc,z,` = 0. Equation (35a) can be re-written as
ui(tj) = max
{
ui(tj+1)− ∆λ
a
γ
(
e−γ(uk(tj+1)−ui(tj+1)) − 1) ; um(tj+1)− η} , (A.11)
for i, k,m ∈ S¯ and λa = λa,z,` for some z and `. Clearly (36), (37) and (38) holds when tj = T .
Suppose they also hold for tj+1 where j ≤ N − 1. Using the fact that ey > 0 for all y and
u(tj+1) ≤ A(T − tj+1), we have
ui(tj) ≤ A(T − tj −∆) + ∆λ
a
γ
≤ A(T − tj),
for A > λa/γ and we have shown (36).
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On the other hand, for i = (z, `,Ξ), (A.11) implies
ui(tj) ≥ ui(tj+1)− ∆λ
a
γ
(
e−γ(uk(tj+1)−ui(tj+1)) − 1)
= ui(tj+1) +
∆λa
γ
e−γ(uk(tj+1)−ui(tj+1))
(
eγ(uk(tj+1)−ui(tj+1)) − 1)
≥ ui(tj+1) + ∆λae−γ(uk(tj+1)−ui(tj+1)) (uk(tj+1)− ui(tj+1))
≥ (1−∆λaeγAT )ui(tj+1)
≥ 0,
for ∆ < e−γAT/λa. In the forth line (third inequality) we use the fact that 0 ≤ ui(tj+1) ≤
A(T − tj+1) ≤ AT and uk(tj+1) ≥ 0. For i = (z, `, y) with y 6= Ξ, (A.11) implies
uz,`,y(tj) ≥ uz,`−1,Ξ(tj+1)− η
≥ −η.

Appendix A.3. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. It suffices to show
F∆i (t, u(t
′), ui)− F∆i (t, v(t′), vi) ≥ 0, (A.12)
G∆i (t, u(t
′), ui)−G∆i (t, v(t′), vi) ≥ 0. (A.13)
The inequality in (A.13) immediately follows from ui ≤ vi. To show (A.12), we assume with out loss
of generality that i = (z, `,Ξ) and λz,z¯,` = λm,z,` = λc,z,` = 0. Let w = u− v and i∗ = (z, `+ 1,Ξ).
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Note that wi(t) = 0, wi(t
′) ≤ 0 and ui∗ = vi∗ . The left-hand-side of (A.12) is
γ
wi(t)
∆
− γwi(t
′)
∆
+ λa,z,`e−γ(ui∗ (t
′)−vi(t′))
(
eγwi(t
′) − 1
)
≥− γwi(t
′)
∆
+ λa,z,`e−γ(ui∗ (t
′)−vi(t′))γwi(t′)
≥
(
− 1
∆
+ λa,z,`e−γ(C
min−Cmax)
)
γwi(t
′)
≥ 0,
for ∆ sufficiently small. 
Appendix B. Estimated Parameters
z = 1 z = 2 z = 3
z¯ = 1 7.769 (0.145) 17.962 (0.891)
z¯ = 2 -14.79 (0.193) 7.939 (0.14)
z¯ = 3 -19.614 (1.095) -8.6 (0.15)
Table B.6: Estimated βZ0,z,z¯ in (2). Numbers in brackets represent standard errors.
z = 1 z = 2 z = 3
z¯ = 1 -2.024 (0.037) -6.621 (0.336)
z¯ = 2 3.932 (0.049) -2.718 (0.046)
z¯ = 3 5.033 (0.292) 2.931 (0.048)
Table B.7: Estimated βZ1,z,z¯ in (2).
βc0,z β
c
1,z β
a
0,z β
a
1,z
z = 1 0.273 (0.005) 0.316× 10−3 (0.043× 10−5) 0.695 (0.005) 0.293× 10−3 (0.004× 10−4)
z = 2 0.54 (0.014) 0.411× 10−3 (0.288× 10−5) 1.945 (0.014) 0.092× 10−3 (0.036× 10−4)
z = 3 0.23 (0.023) 0.52× 10−3 (1.13× 10−5) 2.932 (0.018) −0.714× 10−3 (0.135× 10−4)
Table B.8: Estimated rate of addition and cancellation.
z = 1 z = 2 z = 3
0.044 (3.92× 10−4) 0.175 (0.003) 0.596 (0.012)
Table B.9: Estimated rate of MO arrival.
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z = 1 z = 2 z = 3
r 0.477 (0.002) 0.630 (0.002) 0.866 (0.003)
p 3.339× 10−4 (1.961× 10−6) 5.408× 10−4 (2.968× 10−6) 9.097× 10−4 (4.697× 10−6)
Table B.10: Estimated parameter of MO size distribution (negative binomial) with probability mass function p(k) =(
k+r−1
k
)
(1− p)rpk.
z = 1 z = 2 z = 3
r 6.031 (0.294) 7.530 (0.513) 3.618 (0.452)
p 8.441× 10−4 (4.285× 10−5) 1.9× 10−3 (1.345× 10−4) 2.3× 10−3 (3.041× 10−4)
Table B.11: Estimated parameter of replenished queue length distribution (negative binomial) with probability mass
function p(k) =
(
k+r−1
k
)
(1− p)rpk.
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